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Abstract: In The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, Yoram Hazony contrasts the uses 
of metaphor in Nevi’im and the New Testament. According to Hazony, 
metaphor is employed by Jesus to obscure teachings, but the prophets of the 
Hebrew Scriptures use metaphor to make teachings intelligible. However, this 
understanding of metaphor is too simplistic to capture the scope of metaphorical 
statements made by the Hebrew prophets. In this paper, I suggest that an 
important set of philosophical arguments are advanced by the prophets in ways 
not captured by current interpretive methodologies. The paper is divided into 
two parts. In the first half, I argue against Hazony’s assessment of Nevi’im. In 
the second, I forward my position on the philosophical dimensions of Nevi’im: 
that prophetic writings reveal important moral facts about God’s nature and the 
ways in which we should respond to him in both action and emotion. Appealing 
to the works of Dru Johnson, Eleonore Stump and Linda Zagzebski, I show that 
the writings of the Hebrew prophets may in fact advance certain arguments 
about the emotions and motivations of God. Through the collected writings of 
Nevi’im, God functions as an exemplar for those receiving the words of the 
prophets. 
Keywords: Nevi’im, Hebrew Bible, Metaphor, Exemplarism, Analytic Theology, 
Exegetical Theology 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, Yoram Hazony contrasts the uses of metaphor in 
Nevi’im and the New Testament.1 According to Hazony, metaphor is employed by Jesus 
to obscure teachings, but the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures use metaphor to make 
teachings intelligible (2012, 84-85). Hazony’s treatment of Nevi’im is arguably the most 
influential assessment of the prophetic writings as a means of philosophical argument. 
However, his understanding of metaphor is too simplistic to capture the scope of 
metaphorical statements made by the Hebrew prophets. In the first section of this paper, 
                                                   
1 I’m indebted to Linda Zagzebski, Neal Judisch, Kevin Nordby, Jewelle Bickel, Dru Johnson, as well as 
a particularly helpful referee for their respective comments on this paper.   
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I explain why Hazony’s characterization of Nevi’im fails to adequately address the 
unique contributions of these writings as a genre. I consider three types of passages 
appear incompatible with Hazony’s framework. Ultimately, I think the prophets intend 
rather to build upon what is already recognized as the path to the good life by providing 
further insight into yet a deeper and more complex facet of morality. Prophetic instances 
of metaphor are used not merely to generate moral teachings about the good life and the 
consequences of human behavior; they are also used to describe the motivations and 
dispositions of God.2 Indeed, these metaphorical statements often occur in texts that also 
describe God with what I will argue are non-metaphorical terms signifying emotions 
like םַחָר (compassionate) and סַעָכ (angry).  
In the section that follows, I give my alternative to the position that the prophets 
meant to convey moral imperatives and a theory about the good life. Often the 
prophetic texts purport to give us insight into the reasons why God acts as well as the 
responses from God we should anticipate given the ethical decisions made by humans. 
Many of these passages can be construed as a kind of moral psychology of God. While 
Hazony’s and Eleonore Stump’s (2010) respective works on the uniqueness of Hebrew 
narrative and second-personal knowledge emphasize that narrative is especially suited 
to speak to us about certain aspects of God’s nature, a detailed treatment of prophetic 
writings as a source of second-personal knowledge has not yet been articulated. I 
suggest that an important set of philosophical arguments are advanced by the prophets 
in ways not captured by current interpretive methodologies: The prophetic writings 
reveal important moral facts about God via metaphor and univocal descriptions of 
God’s point of view. One consequence of this view is that, against Hazony, I contend 
that some prophetic language is intentionally opaque. By employing metaphor and 
univocal descriptions of God, the prophets disclose information about God’s nature and 
the ways in which we should respond to him in both action and emotion.  
If Dru Johnson’s account of biblical epistemology is correct, the sort of knowledge 
advocated by Scripture involves reliance on authenticated authorities and participation 
in ritual (2013, 47, 140-149.). Additionally, Stump contends that Franciscan knowledge is 
an important type of knowledge that involves “social cognition or mind reading” (2010, 
71-73). Appealing to the works of Johnson and Stump, I argue that the Hebrew prophets 
may in fact be advancing certain arguments about the emotions and motivations of God 
that are instructive to readers.3 A moral psychology of God is especially well-suited to 
promote the moral development of individuals. Drawing on Linda Zagzebski’s divine 
motivation theory (2004) and recent work on exemplarism (2015, 2017), I contend that 
                                                   
2 E.g., Jeremiah 3: 1, 6-13; Isaiah 49: 15-16; Hosea 1-2. 
3 However, I anticipate that one consequence of my view is that some moral instruction contained in 
the prophetic writings will only be accessible to readers with important corresponding dispositions and 
inaccessible to those without them. 
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the prophetic writings serve the important function of allowing us to see into the ethical 
life of God. Zagzebski persuasively argues that God reveals both motive and emotion 
through the Incarnation; in my paper, I augment this claim to include the revelation of 
the Father through the prophets. Through the prophets, God functions as an exemplar 
for those receiving the words of the prophets. 
 
2. Hazony, Metaphor, and the Prophets 
 
In his recent work on the Hebrew Scriptures, Hazony elaborates on the various types of 
philosophical arguments given in the Hebrew Scriptures. These arguments roughly 
correspond to the genre of the biblical work.4 For example, narratives make arguments 
via contrasts or typologies; in contrast, the prophetic writings primarily employ 
metaphor (Hazony 2012, 66, 68.).5 He illustrates how one might exegete particular 
arguments and philosophical positions through a series of case studies. From what I can 
tell, Hazony does not take himself to be giving an exhaustive list of the ways arguments 
might be articulated in the Hebrew Scriptures. Given the way Hazony aligns 
argumentative strategy with particular rhetorical modes, though, and the fact that these 
rhetorical modes occupy the vast majority of the texts, I would be surprised if Hazony 
did not think that his taxonomy accounts for the greatest plurality of arguments that 
appear in the Tanakh.6 
                                                   
4 It is important to note that Hazony primarily deals with the Hebrew Scriptures as a received text; he 
does not take himself to be engaged in textual criticism. Rather, as I understand him, Hazony sees himself 
as working with the Tanakh as it stands within a particular tradition and assessing if and how it furthers 
those positions that a contemporary audience would recognize as philosophical. Following Hazony, the 
discussion that follows is not directed at deconstructing the text or critiquing those claims made therein 
(whatever those may be). While I recognize that such scholarship is valuable and should certainly play an 
important (if not central) role in our understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures, a detailed discussion of 
such issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will treat the Hebrew Scriptures as a significant 
volume unified by tradition, and I will likewise focus on those themes, ideas, and conventions that strike 
me as most important in this context. It is with such concerns in mind that this essay looks for similarities 
amongst those writings recognized as Nevi’im by tradition despite notable dissimilarities among the very 
same texts: What Nevi’im offers by way of a prophetic genre unique to the Hebrew Bible, and more 
specifically, what Nevi’im offers in the way of philosophical argument, are of chief concern here. 
5 Indeed, there is some dispute in biblical studies as to whether the authors of ancient biblical texts 
considered their anthropological descriptions of God to be metaphorical, or whether they thought of God 
as embodied. For a detailed discussion, see Sommers (2009). Cf. Hamori (2008), Hundley (2013), and van 
der Toorn (1998). If this turned out to be the case, it would only help my argument: The prophetic 
language describing God’s moral deliberations can still serve as exemplary for our own moral formation. 
Still, this paper bypasses such critical concerns because I am assessing the philosophical positions of the 
Hebrew Scriptures as a corpus representative of a particular tradition. (See n. 4.) 
6 See p. 66, where Hazony aligns modes of argument to particular genres of writing in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. His discussion the purpose of the Hebrew Bible is similar divided along lines of genre (2012, 
47-65, especially 63ff). On p. 84, he introduces the discussion of techniques unique to the prophets as 
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For my purposes, it is best to focus on Hazony’s treatment of the prophets. According 
to Hazony, the prophets typically advocate for particular views or actions in ways that 
encourage the reader to extrapolate from the prophet’s words and take a larger view of 
the prophet’s topic (2012, 84). The contemporary reader has trouble identifying these 
arguments because of the way they are conditioned to approach the Hebrew Scriptures. 
Today’s readers do not recognize the way these ancient writers make arguments, and 
the poetic form of the prophets is foreign to many of those who want to understand 
their messages. Further, prophets are assumed to be engaged in some form of future 
telling or “the revelation of secrets” (2012, 86). Perhaps most frustratingly for Hazony, 
readers even expect the prophets to obscure their own meaning and use metaphors to 
conceal their messages. Hazony calls this “esotericism,” a disposition to the texts for 
which the writers of the New Testament (and their depiction of Jesus) are at least 
partially responsible.  
Jesus’s use of parables in the New Testament should instead serve as contrast to the 
prophets, as he is depicted “speaking in parables whose meaning is hidden so as to be 
inaccessible to many or most of those who hear them” (2012, 84). Hazony writes,  
 
“...the association of biblical metaphors with parables and riddles provided a part of the 
explanation for why the prophetic orations of the Hebrew Scriptures seem, to many 
readers, to be something quite different from reasoned discourse. But there, too, what is 
involved is the importation into the older Hebrew texts of purposes that are quite alien 
to them. As far as I can tell, the use of metaphor to obscure God’s teaching from certain 
segments of the population occurs rarely, if at all, in the orations of the prophets of 
Israel...Indeed, the constant reliance on metaphor in the Israelite prophetic orations 
seems to have precisely the opposite purpose: Its aim is to make difficult subjects easier to 
understand for the broad audiences to whom prophetic oratory was, in the first instance, 
intended to appeal.” (2012, 85) 
 
While the prophets’ respective audiences might find ethical theory and abstract 
reasoning challenging, the prophets render these ideas intelligible in their orations by 
translating important thoughts into the language of analogy and metaphor. The 
prophets draw on things familiar to their audiences in an effort to place important moral 
arguments within their reach, where, to apply Hazony’s thinking to Isaiah 5, the 
common sight of a vineyard might stand in for the people of Israel, and the relatable 
vineyard owner for God (2012, 85).  
                                                                                                                                                                    
grounds for interpreting them as making particular arguments. Here again, genre is tied to argumentative 
methodology in a way that suggests while other modes of argument may exist in the Hebrew Scriptures 
in addition to those Hazony discusses, the very genre on the texts necessitate that they will be flush with 
the modes of argument Hazony describes (should he be correct in his analysis). 
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So far Hazony and I are in agreement. I agree that contemporary audiences are naive 
to the genre and aims of the prophetic writings. They seem to be aimed at making 
timely indictments and exhortations to the people of Israel far more than they are 
engaged in future-telling or mystical teaching. Like Hazony, I think that metaphor is 
often used to generate moral teachings in the prophets, and I concede that many of these 
instances of metaphor are intended to render teachings intelligible to their audience. 
Hazony and I must part ways, though, when he begins his exegesis of the book of 
Jeremiah.  
It is helpful to frame what follows in a comment Hazony makes about all of the 
prophets: “What they are searching for is, in fact, lawfulness, in moral order – those laws 
that are God’s will, in the sense that they lead, naturally and reliably, to the life and the 
good” (2012, 89). Hazony’s point here is that the underlying assumption implicit to all of 
the prophetic writings is that there is some kind of moral law at work. The prophets 
expect there to be consequences following deeds: deleterious consequences to immoral 
actions, and whatever consequences amount to the good life following those who 
embrace the moral law.  
In a section tellingly called “Profit and Pain,” Hazony writes,  
 
“If the laws given Israel by God are the natural law for men, then these laws will teach us 
what we must do if we want to attain life and the good, as individuals and as nations, By 
the same token, if we do not obey these laws, we will quickly begin to feel the pain of 
disintegration and collapse that will naturally follow.” (2012, 177) 
 
The picture painted by Hazony in his exegesis of Jeremiah is of a consequentialist or at 
least teleological moral theory emerging from the reasoning of the prophet. Jeremiah 
uses a term, לַעָי, which is often translated profit, benefit, avail, and gain. Moral laws are 
what men need to survive and thrive; ignoring the moral law will result in disastrous 
consequences because humans need to do what is right just as they need water for 
survival. The moral imperatives in the prophets are natural laws that benefit 
humankind. Turning from wrongdoing and living in obedience to God leads to a state 
of flourishing. The prophetic writings exist to illuminate this important relationship 
between morality and human nature; thus Jeremiah describes the pagan gods that have 
no benefit to humankind and the way in which God is like water to his people. 
Jeremiah’s warnings amount to an argument about those things that profit humans and 
those that do not.  
The centrality of this argument to the text is illuminated by a fundamental 
misunderstanding Hazony identifies in relation to his point about natural law and 
human benefit: The common prophetic phrase many translate as the “in the end of 
days” in fact means “in the course of time.” According to Hazony, passages frequently 
construed as pertaining to apocalypse or judgment are really just about how things turn 
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out, the moral order of things, and the way moral laws order the world so that certain 
actions produce certain states of affairs (2012, 89). It is unclear in exactly what way 
Hazony intends us to interpret “in the course of time.” He does not specify whether the 
natural law is good for man because it consists of those things that contribute to human 
flourishing given the way God made humans, or if God intends humans to enjoy a good 
life, and he therefore advises a natural law that will result in their good. In other words, 
it is not apparent whether Hazony reads Jeremiah as making a consequentialist 
argument about what is beneficial to man, or if he thinks Jeremiah has a eudaimonist 
view about what it means to be flourishing humans. In any case, what is clear is that 
Hazony thinks the prophets are primarily concerned with axiomatic principles and how 
they contribute to human wellbeing of some kind or another. 
Indeed, Hazony’s position is rather strong compared to those with less optimistic 
positions (say, a fideist or skeptical theist) concerning the way evils affect humans in the 
world. He thinks the ills that befall trespassers of the law are sufficient to show that the 
law is the “path of what is beneficial and good” (2012, 177). Jeremiah’s argument is 
interpreted as the thesis that “pain and hardship” follow the violation of God’s law 
(2012, 181). These consequences are not merely external. Ignoring or rejecting the 
teaching of God and the moral law has psychological consequences, among them the 
distortion of human thought. The human mind is what Hazony calls “arbitrary,” his 
translation of בל תורירש, where arbitrary means the tendency of the human mind or heart 
to “walk away from those things that are true human ends rather than towards them” 
(2012, 171-72). Humankind is bad at identifying the good and those things that are in 
our best interest. Hazony’s Jeremiah argues that violation of the moral law and false 
ideas about the good render one progressively more insensitive to the truth about the 
good. Remember, though, that this moral devolution is not the result of an act of God 
per se, but rather the native consequences that follow false understanding and wicked 
deeds.7 The word of God, delivered through the prophets, serves to correct such errant 
thinking and behavior.8  
                                                   
7 “One of the more remarkable aspects of Jeremiah’s theory of knowledge is the emphasis the prophet 
places on consequences of maintaining false opinions Jeremiah repeatedly tells us that false opinion has 
painful consequences, which bear down upon and punish those whose understanding is false” (Hazony 
2012,  183). 
8 “Here, then, is Jeremiah’s answer to the question of whether we can escape the false words and false 
understanding that result from the arbitrariness of our minds. True, the mind is deceitful, and when it 
fixes on a mistaken way of seeing things, even painful consequences will not suffice to shake them loose. 
But God’s word is like a hammer that shatters rock. It enters the world and takes on a reality so 
overwhelming that false conceptions, no matter how tightly we cling to them, are destroyed before it. 
Once freed from these false conceptions, a new understanding can arise in the minds of men, one that 
reflects the truth. Knowledge, then, may elude the men of a given time and place. But it is coming. And all 
men, it would appear, have a chance of attaining it ‘in the end’” (Hazony 2012, 186-7). 
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Perhaps the above summary is too drastic a characterization of his position. It is 
unclear, after all, whether Hazony’s claim is that pain and hardship follow the deviation 
from God’s law necessarily, and following God’s law only makes such terrible events 
less likely, or if he holds the stronger view that lack of pain, as well as blessing, 
necessarily follow obedience to the law. If my prior summary of Hazony is too radical, it 
seems Hazony is at least committed to the claim that obedience to the natural law 
diminishes the occurrence of pain and provides some benefits, and that disobedience 
results in at least some negative consequences, such as a decreased ability to recognize 
what is beneficial for humans. In my view, this is also the most charitable reading of 
Hazony for another reason; namely, the theodicetic elements in Hebrew Scriptures do 
not endorse a consequentialist ethics such that the moral law is constituted of whatever 
ultimately leads to our good. Arguably, it does not even endorse the eudaimonist 
perspective that habituation into good actions leads to the good life.9 (More on this 
later.) However, it does emphasize painful consequences that follow from the rejection 
of God and his commands, and it discusses at the length the errors in judgment that lead 
one to forsake God’s way for idolatry and wickedness. 
Such means-ends reasoning certainly does permeate the prophets, but even still I am 
skeptical that this really characterizes the chief aims of any of the prophets, much less 
Jeremiah. Most of biblical literature includes the theme of moral lawfulness and the 
importance of obedience to God’s will (save, perhaps, Esther and Songs). On Hazony’s 
view, the prophets continue to ponder God’s will and the path to the good life, perhaps 
making these ideas more salient to the people of Israel by driving points home with 
graphic poetry, personalized rebukes, and often scathing first-personal style.  
However, there seems to be ample evidence that explorations of the consequences 
that follow actions are not the central focus of prophetic writings. The next section 
examines three types of passages that are not readily reconciled to Hazony’s framework. 
For one, prophets often pronounce detailed criticisms of behavior after judgment is 
already declared and sometimes even after the judgment has already occurred. If the 
central aim of the prophets is to make moral order and natural law intelligible to their 
audiences, it seems they undermine their own purposes by addressing those who are 
too late to turn from their ways and avoid the terrible consequences. Further, things do 
not always turn out the ways we expect when we examine them as Hazony exhorts us 
to, “in the course of time.” The prophets describe at length individuals whose treatment 
does not obviously match their moral status, a strange state of affairs for those who 
would argue that benefit and harm are closely related to the natural law. Finally, the 
prophets put much of their writings to the use of exploring how things are for God and 
not how they are for man. While discussion of God’s perspective on the state of his 
                                                   
9 See, for example, the books of Job or Ecclesiastes. 
METAPHOR AND THE MIND OF GOD IN NEVI’IM 
58 
 
relationship to people is certainly interesting, it does not directly contribute to one’s 
understanding of the natural law.   
I will briefly address my first two objections before describing the third at length, as I 
think the final category of passages turns out to be the most interesting for the 
philosophy of the Hebrew Scriptures. This is because it appears that the prophets build 
upon what their audience should already recognize as the path to the good life by 
providing further insight into yet a more profound and complex aspect of morality. 
They illuminate the emotional and intellectual dispositions of the good, embodied by 
the superlatively good personality: God. 
 
3. Textual Evidence from Nevi’im 
 
If prophetic utterances are intended primarily for the moral instruction of its audience, 
the timing of many prophetic texts undermines the prophets’ purposes. (I will focus my 
comments on the book of Jeremiah since this is the prophetic text chosen by Hazony; 
however, I think most if not all of the prophetic writings contain content relevant to at 
least one of my objections.10) Prophets often deliver censure once judgment has already 
been determined and there is no possibility of God relenting if the people repent. For 
example, God appears to give terms according to which he will rescind his judgment in 
Jeremiah 3, but Jeremiah appears to be so persuaded that judgment will come that he 
even accuses the Lord of deception (4:10). The picture painted by the prophets is often 
that of immediate judgment, such as in Jer. 2 and 6. In fact, in the case of Jeremiah, the 
explicit expectation is that his audience will not heed his warnings about the dire 
consequences of their actions; in Jer. 7:27-29, we see that Jeremiah will declare God’s 
words to the people, but God advises the prophet in advance that the people will not 
                                                   
10 It is worth reiterating here that I will deal with the Hebrew Scriptures as a single corpus representing 
a tradition. Rather than engaging in criticism relevant to a single text and its genesis, this paper endeavors 
to discover the philosophical positions of the Hebrew Bible as it stands as the product of compilation and 
editing over centuries. When examining the Nevi’im and prophetic literature as a genre, I do so with an 
eye to what unites those instances of prophetic literature in the Hebrew Scriptures rather than what might 
unite instances of prophetic literature in (a) a more generalized cultural and historical context that would 
extend to all of ancient Near Eastern literature, or (b) a more localized context specific to the period and 
surroundings of a single writing, say, Amos. Thus, when I describe Jeremiah as declaring some feature of 
God, I am not necessarily making a statement about a historical figure Jeremiah, nor about a single author 
of a text bearing that name. Rather, ‘Jeremiah’ stands in for whatever authors, editors, and compilers are 
responsible for the book of Jeremiah (as the book exists within the Hebrew Scriptures). It may be the case 
that readings such as the one I am advocating rise and fall on the bases of analyses like (a) and (b) above; 
that said, I take it that my argument is compatible with a variety of positions occupied by textual critics. 
Cf. n. 4 and n. 5 of this paper. 
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listen to him. God even goes so far as to tell his people to not bother with praying 
because he will not listen (11:14).11  
Perhaps Hazony takes these writings to serve future audiences who will reflect back 
on the events leading to God’s judgments. This strikes me as unlikely for two reasons. 
First, we would need to ignore the explicit claims the prophetic writers make about their 
intended audiences. In the case of Jeremiah, orations are often preceded by statements 
about who the prophet is expected by God to address (e.g., Jerusalem in Jer. 2:1). 
Second, while the absence of any statement concerning future audiences may not be 
compelling evidence in itself, the prophets were likely familiar with the historical 
writings of the Hebrew Scriptures. In some cases, prophets may have even written 
portions of these historical chronicles.12 The historical writings, as Hazony himself notes, 
make use of a unique rhetorical style not employed in the prophetic writings (except in 
brief digressions, such as Jer. 21 and Is. 36, wherein the latter case Isaiah even appears to 
draw on the actual relevant historical passages as a source or vice versa), and further 
contain statements indicating that they were intended to function as a written history 
for the future people of Israel. Given the change in style and absence of any indication 
that these works were intended for a future audience (both of which were likely 
deliberate choices on the part of the prophetic authors), we should err on reading these 
texts as being directed at those explicitly mentioned in the text. 
Even if the prophetic writings are intended for future audiences and not for the 
prophets’ contemporaries, there are other passages that are not obviously amenable to 
the framework recommended by Hazony. If Hazony is correct, then the prophetic 
writings are intended to demonstrate what actions lead to the good life and those 
actions that result in God’s judgment. However, there are many prophetic passages that 
resemble the seemingly unjust state of affairs in Job more than the teleological teachings 
of Hazony. Often consequences do not match behavior in the prophets. Jeremiah himself 
suffers alongside the objects of judgment in Lamentations even though he is an obvious 
case of someone who has God’s approval in his life and conduct. In other passages, God 
kills the obedient prophet Ezekiel’s wife and children (Ez. 24), and yet in the same book 
God promises rescue and assistance to those who had not yet repented (Ez. 34). The 
book of Hosea is a tragic case of suffering, and the good prophet Hosea’s misery is used 
to demonstrate that God will woo and love those who are yet unworthy, adulterous, 
and vile (Hosea 2). Even if one excuses the sufferings of the prophets as a special case, 
                                                   
11 See also Jer. 13, in which Jeremiah destroys a belt to reflect the current state of affairs for Judah; Jer. 
15.2 in which judgment appears settled; Ez. 2-11, in which preaches judgement on Jerusalem and its 
leaders. In this last passage, the purpose of the book cannot be to bring about repentance in Jerusalem 
because Ezekiel is not even in Jerusalem, but far away in Babylon, and yet judgment is imminent.  
12 For example, Ezra was long thought to author parts of First and Second Chronicles, First and Second 
Kings is traditionally attributed to Jeremiah, and the Talmud describes Samuel, Nathan and Gad as 
authoring First and Second Samuel. 
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there is ample textual evidence of other incongruous consequences that are not 
unfortunate exceptions, but deliberate acts of God. In Ezekiel 37, God announces 
through the prophet not that he will rescue those who repent, but rather that he will 
rescue the wicked from their own sinful backsliding (v. 23).  In Ez. 21, God uses wicked 
Babylon as his sword and gives them Israel and Judah as plunder. Elsewhere in Jer. 25:9 
and 27:6, God calls Babylonian leader Nebuchadnezzar “my servant”13 when he was 
very wicked and idolatrous.14  
So while there are many passages that are consistent with Hazony’s argumentative 
structure, there is an abundance of passages that cannot be interpreted using his 
framework. Hazony’s moral-instruction view may be a useful tool to understand a 
particular passage, especially when the author gives a direct indication that he is 
presenting his view for a contemporary audience within reach of the prophet, or when 
he indicates that deleterious consequences can be avoided through repentance. But this 
tool cannot be applied to large swaths of prophetic literature, and moreover, it cannot be 
derived from the entire rhetorical structure of the prophetic writings because too much 
of the content is incompatible with Hazony’s view. As I mentioned above, though, there 
is still another dimension prophetic discourse that is not easily subsumed under 
Hazony’s argumentative structure.  
This leads to my final objection to Hazony’s assessment of the philosophical status of 
Nevi’im. The most dramatic and unique contribution of the prophetic writings is 
undersold by Hazony. Large portions of Nevi’im are dedicated to revealing a God’s-
eye-view perspective on human events, whether or not this perspective will be of any 
help to the prophet’s stated audience. By God’s-eye-view, I mean to single out passages 
that seem dedicated to revealing God’s motivations, assessments, or even emotions. This 
also includes passages where God singles out the nature of the relationship between 
man and himself rather than the state of affairs between men. For example, in Jer. 2:27, 
Jeremiah reports God’s disapproval that the people have “turned their backs to me and 
not their faces,” and in Jer. 2:31, God reflects on how the people have forgotten how he 
has treated them with the rhetorical statements, “Have I been a desert to Israel or a land 
of great darkness? Why do my people say, ‘We are free, we will come to you no more’?”  
 
4. God’s Perspective in the Prophets 
 
Given the variety of passages that do not neatly fit into Hazony’s description of the 
philosophical aims of the prophetic writings, it is worthwhile to look elsewhere for an 
explanation of what the prophets intended to achieve. The last category of passages 
discussed, those containing a “God’s-eye-view,” deserve closer attention as a unique 
                                                   
13 Unless otherwise stated, all quoted Bible passages are from the New Revised Standard Version.  
14 Is. 44.28 includes a similar statement regarding the pagan king Cyrus. 
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contribution of Nevi’im. I contend that they should feature significantly into our 
attempts to understand the arguments of the prophets. In the sections that follow, I 
describe these passages at length and propose that they serve a unique rhetorical 
function in furthering a distinct philosophical position. More specifically, I explain how 
these passages provide a moral psychology of God and why such a moral psychology 
would be especially beneficial to Nevi’im’s audience.  
One feature of passages containing a God’s-eye-view is that God often invites people 
to reason from his perspective and not their own (Jer. 5:7-9). Surprisingly, when God 
does so, he does not say, as Hazony’s interpretation would indicate, look where your 
actions will lead you but instead look where I stand in relation to you. The word “unfaithful,” 
one indicating the state of a relationship between parties, is used repeatedly, indicating 
that one’s standing to God is at issue and not consequences to oneself.  
While subtle, it is important to stress that this is no trivial distinction. The difference 
between these two approaches to moral failing can be illuminated by comparison to 
human relationships. Consider a parent who tells a child who recklessly texted while 
driving, “You could have died.” Such an indictment invites the child to consider the 
consequences of her behavior. Should the child change her behavior based on this 
reasoning, the motivation would presumably be to avoid future harm. In contrast, 
consider the parent who tells a child, “I am disappointed in you.” This statement does 
not necessarily invoke any deleterious potential consequences to the child. Should the 
child care about her parent’s opinion of her, then perhaps there is a negative 
consequence to the child involved. However, the child can just as readily decide that she 
does not care what her parent thinks (as I imagine many a teenager does) and eschew 
any negative consequences to herself. Should the child be moved by her parent’s 
judgment, it is likely because of the harm that has come to their relationship: An 
expectation or trust has been violated, and now the affective state of the parent has 
changed toward her child. If the trespass is large enough, it will change the way the two 
parties interact, as well as the way the parent views the child. By acknowledging and 
changing her bad behavior, the child is moving towards reconciliation or improved 
standing with her parent.   
Consider yet another case that is perhaps even more similar to the language used in 
the prophets. Suppose a parent prohibits a particular item or activity for a child and 
does so because it is in the child’s best interest. However, the child ignores her parent, 
and instead listens to a friend who recommends that which was prohibited. The child 
ultimately comes to harm. A parent might have two concerns. First, the parent might be 
concerned that if the child continues in this behavior, she will come be harmed again in 
the future. The second and arguably the more important concern is that the child did not 
trust her parent over her friend.  
The latter concern might be more troubling because it stands to undermine other 
things the parent might do in the interest of the child. Further, it may cause the parent to 
METAPHOR AND THE MIND OF GOD IN NEVI’IM 
62 
 
wonder about the state of the relationship between the parent and child given where the 
child directed her trust and attention. Rather than merely be concerned about obedience, 
the wise parent would also worry that the child does not adequately know the parent 
and the extent of the parent’s devotion and wisdom. Similarly, when God’s people 
repeatedly ignore his commands for them, he begins to question whether the people 
know him at all. This lack of knowledge of God’s character is frequently brought up in 
relation to the immoral acts of humans. There are many calls to know God in the 
prophets, and proclamations of judgments often seem to boil down to God’s frustrations 
that his people do not know him (Jer. 2:5, 8, 31; 4:22; 9:24).  
Even the descriptions of wrongdoing are frequently parsed in relational terms, as in 
6: 16-19 where God proclaims the people “have not listened to Me, I said and they 
ignored” (paraphrase). Moreover, he gives reasons for his acts of judgment and appeals 
to examples to illustrate his previous actions based on such motivations (e.g. Jer. 3:4, 
and 7:12). In Jer. 14:10, God explains why he is not answering prayers. Jeremiah goes so 
far as to invite his audience to imagine what it would be like to be God when he records 
God as asking his people to contemplate his reasoning about coming judgments in 9:7, 9, 
“I will now refine and test them, for what else can I do with my sinful people?... Shall I 
not punish them for these things?” 
Additionally, emotional terms are predicated of God throughout the prophets. His 
fierce anger is described in Jer. 4:8, 5:1, 12:13, and 15:14. The people are accused of 
provoking God to anger in 7:18-19 and 8:19. The people are called God’s beloved in 
11:15, and “the beloved of my heart” in 12:7-13. In the latter passage, God states that the 
people who were once the object of his love are now the object of his hatred. The 
anthropomorphisms of Jeremiah are laden with emotionally charged language, such as 
in 14:17, where God cries out, “Let my eyes run down with tears night and day, and let 
them not cease, for the virgin daughter—my people—is struck down with a crushing 
blow, with a very grievous wound” and 15:1, where God announces that “my heart will 
not turn toward” the people and that he has withdrawn love and pity from them.15 
Ezekiel also uses emotional terms like jealous  wrath, burning zeal, and concern (e.g., Ez. 
36).   
Even when passages do not explicitly use terms signifying emotion, they still use 
emotionally-laden imagery: Jeremiah 2:32 uses a vivid bridal metaphor, and 3:1ff 
compares the people to a prostitute with many lovers. The language used by the 
prophets invokes a sense of intimacy and relationships that are characterized by intense 
passion and emotion, such as a divorced man and his remarried wife in Jer. 3:3, 4; sexual 
imagery in 3:6, 19ff; and a grieving father in 3:4, 19. The repeated appearance of 
metaphors that evoke a visceral emotional response in the reader suggests that strong 
emotion is an intentional theme of God’s relationships to his people and that the 
                                                   
15 In some passages it is admittedly not clear if it is God or Jeremiah speaking. See Jer. 4:18-21 and 9:10. 
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passionate nature of the human-God connection is what the metaphors are meant to 
recommend to the audience. 
It is this particular facet of the prophetic writings that I argue should at least be an 
important lens through which we read the prophetic genre, if not the lens. Note that 
many other types of passages can be subsumed under the idea of a God’s-eye-view: 
Hazony’s moral-instruction passages indicate what leads to a worthwhile life in the eyes 
of God, if not always in the eyes of man, and the sort of man and actions that amount to 
the truly good life. Descriptions of the ethically normative dimensions of human events 
are made salient by God’s interjections about how he responds to the decisions of man, 
articulated through the voice of a prophet. Such passages serve something like a helpful 
epilogue when the narrator helpfully summarizes the principal lessons in a morality tale 
or fable. Even when earthly consequences do not seem properly related to the moral 
qualities of human actions, as in the examples mentioned in my second objection, we 
can read these passages as expressing what God thinks ought to follow such actions or 
why such suffering is being admitted on the part of his chosen representative. In other 
cases, God oftentimes mentions purpose for which he is withholding judgment from the 
wicked, even if just for a season.  
If my assessment is correct, the entirety of the prophets serves as a portion of 
Scripture in which the prophets relate the words that God, as Jeremiah said, “put in 
[my] mouth” and felt like a “burning fire” that “I cannot (hold it in)” (Jer. 1:9; 20:9). 
Jeremiah’s feelings of unworthiness, much like Moses’s trepidation to relate God’s 
words to the Hebrews and pharaoh, as well as the experience of purification related by 
Isaiah, reflect the significance of their respective callings as vehicles for a unique 
expression of God’s perspective (Is. 6, Jer. 1). A possible exception is the book of 
Habakkuk, in which the prophet argues with God about apparent injustices. The book 
also serves as a vehicle for many of Habakkuk’s thoughts. However, many of the 
prophetic writings reflect similar anxieties and protestations (e.g., Lamentations) of 
God’s judgment, and significantly, Habakkuk also relates God’s responses to his 
prayers, in which God provides his motivations and sizes up the inadequacies of 
Habakkuk’s appraisal of human circumstances. Even this unique contribution to 
Nevi’im, then, manifests an emphasis on literature that describes a God’s-eye-view. 
 Before continuing to why I think this aspect of prophetic literature is important to 
recognize for those engaged in the philosophy of Hebrew Scriptures, there is one more 
worry worth addressing here: Maybe I am making too much out of something that is 
only trivially true. One might protest that all of the Hebrew Scriptures purport to show a 
God’s-eye-view, if only by recounting the experiences of those wrestling with God, like 
Jacob. One might think that pointing out the presence of this element in the prophetic 
writings is not instructive because it does not show us anything that is uniquely true 
about Nevi’im from which we can derive interpretive principles.  
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It may very well be the case that all, or at least most, of the Hebrew Scriptures are 
intended to tell us something about what God is like and his take on human affairs, 
whether via pronouncements through Abraham or the philosophical derivations of 
Solomon as he reflects on the nature of life in relationship to the existence of God. My 
claim that Nevi’im provides a God’s-eye-view is not trivial, though, because of the scope 
and function of the God’s-eye-view provided. Prophetic literature is singular in its 
expression of intimacy with God’s thoughts and (so will I argue) emotions. The 
prophetic writings consist of thoroughgoing recordings of God’s words that are often 
declared by the prophets as their reasons for writing anything at all, and they are 
transcribed in a first-personal way that only appears in short passages of other genres. 
The scope of these descriptions has an important function; my next sections are devoted 
to establishing what this function is. For all of these reasons, I contend that the reader 
ought to consider this dimension of prophetic literature as importantly unique, and 
therefore worthy of consideration as to its aims and whether such aims might merit 
inclusion in our interpretative strategies.  
Whether or not my reader agrees that this aspect of the prophetic literature deserves 
to be our primary framework for reading scriptures in the prophetic genre, I hope that I 
have convinced her that it at least consumes a considerable portion of the literature and 
is therefore deserving of the attention of philosophers and theologians reading the 
Hebrew texts. If she is yet unconvinced, perhaps a discussion of what such passages are 
intended to reveal might serve as further persuasion. 
 
5. God’s Perspective and the Language of Divine Emotion 
 
I mentioned before that this last set of passages expressing a “God’s-eye-view” (that is, 
those in which God expresses his perspective on human states of affairs) turn out to be 
the most interesting for the philosophy of Hebrew Scriptures. When engaging in the 
philosophy of Hebrew Scripture and approaching these books as works of reason, I 
think an important question to ask is why writers choose to employ the particular genres 
they did. After all, the narratives of the Hebrew Scriptures can be read as parables; the 
prophets could have recorded morality tales that would have just as easily relayed 
moral principles and engaged in the search for truth Hazony finds so salient in the 
prophets. This is not to say that I think Hazony is wrong about the way prophetic works 
are suited to show how God’s word cuts through the “arbitrariness” of the human 
mind. But if this is the central purpose of the prophets, it is puzzling why the prophets 
frequently purport to record God’s voice and inner experience. For example, Jeremiah 
gives many of his orations from his own perspective (e.g., Jer. 10:17-25; 14:17-22). One 
could arguably omit entire sections that occur in the voice of God and lose nothing on 
Hazony’s view. 
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So far as I can tell, the inclusion of the passages upon which my third objection is 
built accomplish something that none of the other passages in the Hebrew Scriptures are 
equipped to do. The contribution of these sections provides yet further important moral 
information that many of the prophets seem to think we need when meditating on the 
laws of God and the way of man. God’s motivations and dispositions are not deemed 
irrelevant by the prophets, but rather recorded alongside other orations. They certainly 
must have possessed incentive to not use such language! I imagine these passages—that 
for simplicity I will henceforth call “Godview passages,” despite all of the term’s 
theological infelicities—would be the most daunting to write, as failing to truthfully 
articulate the perspective of God would be a damning task indeed. And yet here we find 
them running parallel with more comfortable passages about our human error and 
immorality. Surprisingly, we find orations from God himself that are in some ways 
remarkably similar to our own inner experiences of emotion and cognition.  
As the above passages illustrate, Hazony and others treat descriptions of God in the 
prophets as metaphorical, recognized as such by the use of anthropomorphisms (e.g., 
Jer. 9:12 where God is described as having ה ֶּפ, a mouth). While I am not aware of any 
contemporary philosophers or theologians who read these passages as anything other 
than metaphorical (although I am sure they are out there), there is some disagreement 
about the status of these metaphors in biblical studies.16 Theologians and philosophers, 
though, when seeking to uncover normative claims within the text, typically discount 
such readings of anthropomorphisms, at least insofar as they might be relevant to any 
view worth forwarding today. They suppose that when we read passages about God’s 
frown or staff or hand, it is doubtful that we should understand the text as making a 
metaphysical assertion about God’s constitution and whether he exists as an extended 
being, and whether God really does have a celestial staff as Zeus was thought by the 
Greeks to possess a shield.  
There is significant disagreement about the exact linguistic function of metaphors, but 
at the very least they serve to elicit a particular response in which the audience is invited 
to think of the subject as in some way similar to otherwise dissimilar object.17 In the case 
of Jer. 3:12, the mention of a physical organ like a mouth is intended to bring to mind 
                                                   
16 See n. 5 above. Concerning my position, it only matters that the relevant descriptions of God 
espoused by the prophets serve as a morally informative model for human beings, regardless of whether 
the biblical authors intended for God to be understood as embodied.  
17 See Soskice (1985) and Heim (2014) for more recent discussions of metaphor. While these works each 
contribute accounts in which metaphor performs a unique and valuable function in discourse, both 
Soskice and Heim resist the idea that metaphorical speech can be translated or synthesized into univocal 
statements. However affecting, such accounts of metaphor maintain a “vertiginous” quality (to use 
Soskice’s term) and ultimately remain consistent with the historical dialectic concerning the various 
limitations of metaphor, analogy, and univocal predications. By my lights, God’s-eye-view passages do 
not have this vertiginous quality and are better suited to univocal reading described below. 
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speech familiar to humans and make a comparison to what God might have done for 
the people of Judah. The point of the sentence is not the metaphysical constitution of 
God, but rather whether man understands God. The idea of a human mouth is invoked 
simply to this end. 
It is in this spirit that many passages attributing emotion to God have been 
interpreted. To gloss over a complex history for the sake of brevity, the medieval 
philosophers, following a subset of Hellenistic thought from ancient Greece, considered 
“the passions” to be a physical phenomenon. The early modern philosophers followed 
suit, with thinkers like Kant making a sharp division between reason and the lower 
bodily faculty of emotions. In any case, emotions were tied to bodily states, such as the 
flushing of the face when one feels shame, or the burning sensible experience 
accompanying jealousy. Further, God’s emotions appear to change, and this could not 
be an accurate literal description of God given the widespread conviction that God is 
immutable. Emotionally-loaded passages, like Jer. 7:18 in which God is described as סַעָכ, 
angry or Jer. 12:15 in which God is described with םַחָר, compassion, were thought to be 
metaphorical. 
At the very least, then, we are given some descriptions of what God is like via 
metaphor, and it is language about God in a unique context: God’s self-descriptions of 
his engagement with the moral facets of human experience. Metaphorical language is 
vague and unwieldy, but if we take the prophets at their word, these metaphors are how 
God would have us think of him when we wonder how he looks upon us in our most 
backslidden or oppressed states. At most, though, these metaphors function as epistemic 
placeholders for what God is really like.  
Even if one does not find such anthropomorphism instructive, I have yet to argue my 
most controversial point: It is wrong to treat all of these statements as though they are 
metaphorical. Some are not metaphorical, but literal and possibly even univocal, and 
these passages provide important information about God’s moral psychology. First, 
though, some philosophy of language is in order.  
It is helpful to consider the linguistic reasons why emphasis has not been placed 
upon the Godview texts I find so important, despite the fact that they are plentiful in 
Nevi’im. As I mentioned, metaphorical language is not terribly informative. It would be 
difficult to forward an argument about what God is like on metaphor alone. It is 
unsurprising then that those who take prophetic language to be largely metaphorical do 
not recognize that arguments about God’s moral psychology occur in the text. Take, for 
example, the account of the prophetic works we recently examined in the first part of 
this paper. Most of Hazony’s positions on language about God rest on a central 
assumption about divine predication: 
 
“Theologians have long been of the opinion that human categories cannot describe God 
directly, so that all of our terms for describing God are necessarily metaphors— terms 
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drawn from other domains and used with reference to God by way of analogy. This is 
not merely an opinion of later theologians. We can easily see that the prophets and 
scholars who composed the Hebrew Bible were aware that all terms for God are 
metaphors from the fact that they freely use multiple and shifting metaphors for one and 
the same aspect of God’s actions in the world. Indeed, we can say that the Bible relies 
upon “mixed metaphor” as perhaps the principal means by which human beings can 
approach a knowledge of God!” (2015). 
 
Hazony’s description of theological perspectives on metaphor is mistaken. As I have 
already mentioned, there is by no means consensus among scholars of Scripture about 
the nature of divine predications. Even if we rule out those arguments specific to biblical 
studies, there are considerable reasons to doubt Hazony’s depiction of biblical language 
from within the fields of theology and philosophy. While this is not the venue to settle 
the matter about what forms of predication are available to finite humans who intend to 
truthfully describe God, I want to at least make the case that we can by no means 
assume all of this language is metaphorical by way of a more detailed overview of the 
philosophy of language concerning theistic predication.   
First, metaphorical predications have a long history of being rejected by philosophers 
and theologians for many descriptions of God in the Scriptures. The medieval writers 
divided language about God into two categories: metaphorical and literal (Freddoso, 
n.d.). Metaphorical predications were the most remote forms of predication. As is likely 
clear from the discussion in the prior section, metaphors included the 
anthropomorphism of God (“God’s hand,” “God sits on his throne”) as well as 
comparisons of God to other parts of his creation (“God is a lion,” “God is our rock”). 
Since the objects to which God is compared in these statements were thought to be 
things with essential qualities that are incompatible with God’s nature (such as being 
extended, temporal, imperfect, and finite), philosophers thought these predications tell 
us the least about what God actually is like.   
Despite the mention of essences that Hazony would likely reject, the motivations for 
the metaphorical views of the Medievals seem similar to Hazony’s: They thought that 
God’s transcendence was so great that anything a human could be acquainted with (and 
thus attribute to God) would be so imperfect and distant from his actual nature that the 
proposition would be no more than a metaphor. However, unlike Hazony’s assessment 
of contemporary theologians, the Medievals did not universally embrace metaphorical 
language. For example, Maimonides recognized the use of metaphor in Scripture, but he 
still rejected metaphor and analogy as means of speech about God (Benor 1995, Lahey 
1993). The most significant objection to metaphorical forms of predication is that it does 
little to provide us with any real understanding of God’s nature and may even amount 
to agnosticism. Once metaphorical language is determined to be the only method for 
talking about God, it becomes difficult to see how we could know anything about what 
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is salient in our metaphors in helping us to understand God. Many, like Maimonides, 
came to embrace negative theology because of this very problem (Broadie 1987, 159; cf. 
Buijs 1998). 
One alternative for the Medievals was literal predication, which for them included 
univocal, equivocal and analogical forms of predication. Because of a widespread 
misunderstanding of literal predication that I will turn to in a moment, it is worth 
discussing the history of literal predication in more detail. If we take the view of the 
medieval philosophers, univocal predication is the strongest form of predication. When 
we predicate univocally of God, claims such as “God has knowledge like man has 
knowledge” mean that God has knowledge of the same species or kind that the term 
“knowledge” signifies in our ordinary discourse about man’s knowledge (Freddoso 
n.d.). Duns Scotus and William of Ockham both endorsed univocal predications of God 
(Langston 1979). 
Equivocal predication designates homonyms, such as “a bow” worn by the 
neighborhood hipster and “a bow” such as the one Katniss Everdeen used to kill 
President Coin. This sort of predication uses a single term to signify two distinct things. 
Finally, analogical predication—historically one of the most popular positions on divine 
predication—is employed when what is predicated is not identical in two propositions 
but importantly related in some way. If we predicate analogically of God, then when we 
say “God has knowledge like man has knowledge,” we are not signifying the same form 
of knowledge that humans have (as in univocal predication); instead we are claiming 
that God’s knowledge is somehow significantly related to man’s knowledge, but the two 
terms “knowledge” are not identical (Freddoso n.d.). 
Analogy was thought to be a stronger form of predication than metaphor because the 
nature of the relation standing between the two subjects could be specified. Scholastic 
philosophers recognized multiple forms of analogy. An analogy based upon 
proportions was referred to as a proportional analogy or “proper” analogy (Ashworth 
1999). This was contrasted with attributive analogies. Attributive analogies 
distinguished terms on the basis of priority. Aristotle gives an example of attributive 
analogies when he describes the relationship between various terms related to health. 
(Ashworth 1999). “Healthy diet”, “healthy complexion” and “healthy person” are all 
distinct terms, and yet the sense in which diets or complexions are healthy is dependent 
upon the idea of a healthy person (Metaphysics 994a1-20). In this sense “healthy person” 
is prior to the terms “healthy diet” and “healthy complexion.”18 Finally, medieval 
                                                   
18 Ashworth (1999) provides a helpful summary of Aristotle, who was largely responsible for 
introducing the distinctions between forms of literal predication: “The Categories opens with a brief 
characterization of terms used equivocally, such as ‘animal’ used of real human beings and pictured 
human beings, and terms used univocally, such as ‘animal’ used of human beings and oxen. In the first 
case, the spoken term is the same but there are two distinct significates or intellectual conceptions; in the 
second case, both the spoken term and the significate are the same. We should note that equivocal terms 
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philosophers identified an analogy of imitation or participation. This form of analogy 
indicated that the terms were related by a kind of likeness unique to that between God 
and his creatures. The attributes of humans are analogically related to God’s insofar as 
they reflect God or participate in his qualities. Aquinas argued in favor of using 
attributive analogy to predicate things of God.19 Cajetan further elaborated on Aquinas’s 
version of analogy by expounding on the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction of analogical 
predications.20 
                                                                                                                                                                    
include homonyms (two words with the same form but different senses, e.g., ‘pen’), polysemous words 
(one word with two or more senses), and, for medieval thinkers, proper names shared by different 
people.”  
19 Ashworth (1999) explains Aquinas’s reasons for embracing attributive analogy: “Against this 
background, Aquinas asks how we are to interpret the divine names. He argues that they cannot be 
purely equivocal, for we could not then make intelligible claims about God. Nor can they be purely 
univocal, for God's manner of existence and his relationship to his properties are sufficiently different 
from ours that the words must be used in somewhat different senses. Hence, the words we use of God 
must be analogical, used in different but related senses. To be more precise, it seems that such words as 
‘good’ and ‘wise’ must involve a relationship to one prior reality, and they must be predicated in a prior 
and a posterior sense, for these are the marks of analogical terms... he came to place much greater 
emphasis on agent causation, the active transmission of properties from God to creatures, than on 
exemplar causality, the creature's passive reflection or imitation of God's properties. In this context, 
Aquinas makes considerable use of his ontological distinction between univocal causes, whose effects are 
fully like them, and non-univocal causes, whose effects are not fully like them. God is an analogical cause, 
and this is the reality that underlies our use of analogical language.” For more on this, see Ashworth in 
the bibliography.  
20 Cajetan thought that the forms of analogical predication can either indicate that the subject of the 
predication has the attribute intrinsically as a real feature of the subject, or that the subject of the 
predication only can only be said to have the attribute extrinsically, meaning that the subject can only be 
said to possess the attribute “by reference” to some other being. Attributive analogy, according to Cajetan, 
predicates features of God like goodness or knowledge intrinsically, and creatures possess these attributes 
extrinsically, due to their ontological dependence upon God for these features. This is because God has 
the position of ontological priority in attributive analogy, while creatures are ontologically posterior. In 
contrast proportional analogy predicates some attribute intrinsically to both subjects of the predication—
both can rightly be said to possess the attribute in and of themselves, and not just to possess an important 
relationship to a prior being. What distinguishes the two subjects is the difference in degree, amount, etc., 
as two mathematical figures may have proportional relationship to each other. Cajetan contended that 
(with the exception of the term being, which was properly an attributive analogical predication) most 
theological predications of God should be thought of as proportionally predicating of God. As has been 
pointed out by Ralph McIrney (2011), Cajetan criticizes Aquinas on the grounds that his analogy of proper 
proportionality requires univocity. While the extrinsic/intrinsic denominations of attributive analogy 
permit one to claim that what we predicate of both God and his creatures are of a different kind or 
species, proper proportionality when applied to God requires that we attribute things intrinsically. If we 
predicate things of God and man intrinsically we must mean that there is not merely a relationship 
between God and goodness, and man and goodness, that is preserved by the analogy. Goodness must be 
found in God and in man—goodness merely differs in degree. McIrney thinks Cajetan is wrong in his 
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6. Predicating Emotions of God in Contemporary Philosophy 
 
This discussion of medieval views of predication is instructive not just as evidence that 
the relationship between metaphor and literal language is grossly oversimplified in 
modern discourse. As William Alston points out in Divine Nature and Human Language, 
the term “literal” is often conflated with “univocal” and “empirical” language. 
Analogical language can arguably be literal, and the idea that literal language must be 
empirical, that is, derived from creaturely experience in the natural world, only follows 
if we are also committed to empiricist theories of meaning (according to which all 
human experience and cognition features the physically sensible world alone) (Alston 
1989, 25). Theists do not have to embrace such theories, and indeed many do not: One 
might embrace sensus divinitatis (the idea that humans have a specific faculty for 
perceiving the divine), or like Alston dispute that human experience is confined to the 
natural. One can also contest the theories of language that rule out literal predications 
and, like Richard Swinburne (2007) and Kevin Hector (2011, 2014), maintain that it is 
public use (and not features of mental representation and experience) that determine 
whether language is literal. 
For my purposes, I am not sure that it matters which form of literal predication one 
embraces, but I am inclined to think my reading of the prophets is more suited to one of 
the stronger analogical positions (e.g., attributive analogy) or univocal predication. I 
myself have argued in favor of univocal predications following William Alston 
elsewhere, so it is from this perspective I am going to proceed.21 
Theologians and philosophers often take terms signifying emotions and affective 
states as metaphorical, while not doing likewise for terms like wisdom and goodness, 
because of what is thought to be entailed by particular terms. Often proponents of 
analogy and univocal predication think that wisdom can be so predicated of God 
because they think there is not anything in the ontology of wisdom that entails 
properties or states antithetical to the nature of God.22 While wisdom, so far as we 
understand it, is realized in humans in a way that requires its subject to possess 
particular traits, there is nothing about wisdom per se that entails that it cannot be 
realized in an immaterial, immutable being (or so the argument goes).  
Wisdom, goodness and perfection, when predicated of God, entail different things 
than when they are predicated of humans. If one is a proponent of analogical 
predication, she might argue that God’s wisdom is metaphysically prior to human 
                                                                                                                                                                    
criticisms of Aquinas and that one can make proportional analogies while still maintaining that one 
subject’s predicate is of the extrinsic denomination, while the other is of the intrinsic denomination.  
21 See chapter four of my dissertation, Essays on Discourse by and about the Divine (2016). 
22 See, for example, Swinburne (2007, 227ff). 
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wisdom, and while God is so transcendent that we cannot fathom what his wisdom is 
like, we can at least say that our wisdom is dependent on God’s wisdom for its 
existence. Conversely, if one is a fan of univocal predication, she might instead argue 
that wisdom is being used in the same sense regardless of whether it is predicated of 
God or man and that differences in logical entailments do not amount to a difference in 
sense because the entailment is a product of the meaning of the word God rather than 
the predications themselves. In Revelation, Richard Swinburne makes a similar argument 
in favor of univocal predication for some predications of divine attributes: “God is wise” 
entails that God is essentially wise (whereas “Socrates is wise” does not) because we are 
antecedently committed to certain facts about God: “’x is God’ by itself entails ‘x is 
essentially wise’, or... it entails ’if x is wise, then he is essentially wise’” (2007, 227). Put 
succinctly, suppose that we are committed to all of God’s properties being essential 
properties. Or suppose we take the word God to necessitate certain perfections. 
Swinburne thinks these commitments do not affect the sense of the word wise itself.23 
They only affect the sense of the word God. It turns out that when we say God is wise, he 
is essentially wise, etc. This is a function of either the sense of the word God, or it is a 
result of what is entailed by two independent premises, neither of which relies on the 
sense of wise having any unusual properties.24 
                                                   
23 This is because Swinburne argues that words coined in the context of mere human experience can be 
employed in “new circumstances” while retaining their normal sense (2007, 225). Swinburne mentions 
two examples of such circumstances: a) when the word “diameter” is used for both the 1 meter diameter 
of a ball and the 300,000 lighter-year diameter of a galaxy, and b) when the word “cause” is used in saying 
that an explosion causes the collapse of a galaxy and a chatty individual causes those around him to be 
annoyed. Similarly, just because we use the word “wise” of a dramatically different subject (God) than we 
would in our mundane uses of the word, does not imply that the word “wise” has undergone any change 
any more than “cause” or “diameter” has undergone change. The fact that their predicate schemes are 
preserved shows that the senses are the same. 
24 Here it is helpful to see how Swinburne’s view comes apart from more traditional views like 
Aquinas’s. Aquinas denied that doctrinal terms should be understood univocally because of this 
metaphysical commitment concerning properties. According to Aquinas, if we predicate univocally of 
God, claims such as “God has knowledge like man has knowledge” mean that God has knowledge of the 
same species or kind that the term “knowledge” signifies in our ordinary discourse about man’s 
knowledge (Freddoso). (Once again, we find Hazony and Aquinas in agreement, if albeit for very 
different reasons!) This understanding of univocal predication commits theists to attributing undesirable 
properties to God, and for this reason Aquinas rejected the notion that we can make univocal predications 
of God. On Swinburne’s view, the theist is obligated to no such metaphysical positions when she makes 
univocal predications: “Words which denote properties in beings of different genera may be univocal (in 
my sense of ‘univocal’), and how we derive our understanding of the sense of a word does not have such 
a direct relation to what that sense is. We may learn what a word means by learning the syntactic criteria 
for its application and observing objects to which it paradigmatically applies; and this may allow us to 
ascribe it in the same sense to objects which we cannot observe” (2007, 228). However, it is not clear that 
Swinburne can use a word univocally while remaining so agnostic about the metaphysical implications of 
the word.  
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Those who deny univocal predication is suitable for statements about God often do 
so in virtue of God’s transcendence. The idea is that the vast difference between God 
and His creation is sufficient to undermine our ability to know sufficient truth-
conditions for univocal predication and the content of words applied to God. Swinburne 
argues, contra advocates of analogical predication, that the human inability to “know 
what it is like to be God, how God knows things, or from which (if any) deeper 
properties of God his wisdom derives” does not put any constraints on our ability to 
predicate univocally of God (2007, 229). He denies that such lack of knowledge affects 
our ability to know the relevant truth-conditions for predicates like wise. Further, we 
commonly make predications of creatures whose experiences are very remote from us: 
We do not know what it is like to be a bat, but we still say bats perceive, intending the 
sense of perceive to be univocal with humans perceive. 
Whether or not one agrees with Swinburne’s account of univocal predication, his 
arguments concerning terms like wisdom have similar consequences for terms signifying 
emotional states.25 As I mentioned in the prior section, emotions, according to a long 
history of theologians and philosophers, are necessarily physical, and thus disqualified 
from any literal forms of predication. However, things are not nearly this clear cut. For 
one, even our application of everyday predicates to material, empirical objects is 
incredibly complicated. To use Swinburne’s above example, it is not obvious to me that 
we do use perceive univocally when we say that bats perceive. Consider a more dramatic 
example: the caterpillar perceives the leaf, or the lobster perceives the boiling water. In these 
cases, words that seem obviously univocal given our contact with these animals, upon 
closer examination appear to be used in an analogical sense. This is because caterpillars 
and lobsters have radically dissimilar nervous systems from humans. Much of what we 
think are the relevant states of affairs for determining the truth-values for uses of 
perceive involves certain assumptions about what is required for mental states. In the 
absence of specific metaphysical commitments to things like caterpillar souls, the fact 
that caterpillars and lobsters possess different nervous systems (and in the case of 
lobsters, lack brains altogether) casts considerable doubt on whether such animals 
perceive in the same sense that humans do.  
Returning to the example of bats, the sense in which we use perceive for life forms that 
share similar but not identical anatomy is at the very least ambiguous. There is very 
likely significant disagreement and linguistic ambiguity on exactly what perceive, so 
applied, entails for bats. Those more optimistic about animal intelligence or animal souls 
might be willing to affirm the exact same predicate entailments for both bats and 
humans; however, it seems just as possible that a large (if not majority) segment of the 
                                                   
25 Swinburne is not himself an advocate for univocal predications of emotion to God. He explicitly 
argues against univocal predications of emotions for reasons similar to those I will address in this section; 
as a result, I think his argument fails. 
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linguistic community might think there is only some overlap in our uses and 
understanding of human and bat perception. They would argue that perceive has two 
senses or that we are using perceive analogically.26 Additionally, the scope of 
dissimilarity between humans and bats may turn out to be trivial compared to the 
dissimilarity between humans and a transcendent God.  
Even if we can use “perceive” univocally of bats, using mundane words to predicate 
of God seems an entirely different matter. Humans and bats share important features: 
Bats are spatially and temporally situated; aspects of their anatomy are similar to ours; 
and they manifest certain behaviors that resemble our own. It is possible to predict 
certain implications of a bat perception given these shared features. However, it is 
difficult to see how we can anticipate the implications of God’s wisdom given our own 
experience of wise humans. We observe wisdom obtaining in a human agent in 
spatiotemporal contexts: Wisdom produces certain results over time, implies certain 
things about their cognitive abilities, etc. We know none of these things for God.27 
Nevertheless, many of us do not want to abandon literal forms of predication in favor 
of metaphorical predication for reasons already mentioned. Rather, it seems that at least 
one of our reasons for discounting terms signifying emotion –our familiarity with 
emotions being realized in a very specific way in humans– is not a good reason to draw 
a distinction between it and other terms thought to be literal, like wisdom and goodness. 
Whether perceives and wisdom are analogical or univocal predicates, they share the 
propensity to be recognized in subjects that might realize these predicates in 
significantly different ways. 
Returning to the claim that terms like angry are metaphorical because they are 
marked, in part, by their physical manifestations in humans,28 this could be merely a 
function of how emotion realizes itself in humans and not a feature intrinsic to emotion 
                                                   
26 Disagreements about bat perception highlight two important problems for Swinburne’s account. 
What facts are relevant to establishing the sense of a word? Swinburne’s use of predicate scheme is 
promising, but the synonyms, antonyms, determinates, and determinables of a given word are not clearly 
delineated. When we say that a bat perceives, does our sense of “perceive” include the idea “realized in x 
brain state”? Does “perceive” entail that perceiving comes with a certain set of phenomenal qualities? 
Swinburne would certainly say no. However, if the sense of a word merely depends on publically agreed 
upon criteria, it could turn out that the sense of “perceive” carries with it these metaphysical implications. 
27 Swinburne may just deny that any of these things are relevant to the meaning of “wise” and insist 
that the dissimilarity I just described only affects the sense of the word “God” and not the word “wise”. 
But when making distinctions between analogical and univocal predications, Swinburne helps himself to 
metaphysical implications that it seems he should ignore if he is to remain consistent with the view he 
expresses here.  
28 Swinburne argues that the words pity, love, and anger all include desire and bodily sensation in their 
meanings: “No one is really angry or feels pity or love unless they feel these things in their stomach or 
breasts or bowels or behind the eyes, and have an urge, hard to control, to vent their anger or show their 
pity and love” (2007, 230). 
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itself. Given that we deny that the physical implications of a bat perceiving has bearing 
on the sense of the word perceives, we can also deny that the physical implications of a 
human’s experience of anger has any bearing on the meaning of anger itself, and thereby 
apply it to God. More to the point, why can we not say that anger is like wise: It is not 
that the sense of anger changes when we predicate it of God, it is that the meaning of 
God and human entail different things about anger obtaining in God and humans 
respectively. Conversely, if bat perception is only perception in the analogical sense of 
the word due to how it is realized, God’s anger should be understood as analogical as 
well (albeit of a different scope).  
To successfully deny that the physical dimensions of emotion are essential, or to use a 
less metaphysically-loaded word, central, to the sense of emotion, one would need some 
kind of evidence that physical states are tied to emotions ontologically.  This is not 
consistent with current thought on emotions, though; most recent work on emotion 
affirms the plausibility of my position. Contemporary research on emotion is not in 
agreement on the relationship between bodily states and emotions even so far as 
humans are concerned. While some philosophers and scientists do indeed consider 
bodily states to be an essential component of emotions, others dispute this claim, 
arguing that different emotions can produce identical physical reactions and that this is 
evidence that the bodily manifestations of emotion are not identical to the emotions 
themselves (de Sousa 2003). Linda Zagzebski famously disputed the long-observed 
distinction between cognitive and emotional states, arguing instead that emotions 
should be defined as a state that has inseparable cognitive and affective content, and 
further, made the case that emotions play a key role in moral judgment (1998). 
Psychological studies seem to indicate that humans identify identical physiological 
states with different emotional states depending on what beliefs or intentional objects 
correspond with the physiological state in question, suggesting that the emotional 
content is something over and above a physical state (Barrett 2006). There is at least 
reason to doubt that the physicality of emotions is inseparable from emotions 
themselves rather than the way in which they are realized in humans. 
Turning back to the question of divine emotions, if emotions are not necessarily 
physical as was assumed by the Ancients, Medievals, and Early Moderns, there is no 
compelling reason to rule them out as divine predicates. It is possible that God has 
emotions much like we think God has thoughts; his emotions simply do not entail those 
aspects of emotion that are perceptible in human expressions of emotion but 
incompatible with his nature. A similar argument is made by Zagzebski: Zagzebski 
contends that so long as emotions are an aspect of our personhood and not of our nature 
as humans, it is possible that God has (perfect) emotions (2004, 204ff). She contends that 
emotions need not imply passivity or change; rather, Zagzebski contends that godly 
emotions can be understood much like we understand godly thoughts or beliefs. Many 
of the qualities of thoughts and beliefs that seem incompatible with divine attributes 
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apply to emotions as well. Thoughts and beliefs strike us as time-bound and mutable 
just as feelings do, and yet we can imagine God has knowledge that is immutable and 
eternal. Affective states could likewise be immutable and eternal. She writes, “It can be 
shown that God has seemingly mutable emotions in the same way that he has seemingly 
mutable knowledge” (2004, 208-209). If Zagzebski is right, there is no reason to object to 
statements describing divine emotions, and our traditional reasons for reading such 
statements metaphorically should be reconsidered. In the absence of textual evidence 
suggesting prophetic authors intended to speak metaphorically, interpreters of Nevi’im 
can read Godview statements containing emotion as literal. 
 
7. Zagzebski and the Emotions of God 
 
Zagzebski’s work on emotion turns out to be extremely important for her ethical theory, 
and it is this theory that provides insight into why the prophets may have included so 
many Godview passages in their writings. Zagzebski’s divine motivation theory and 
exemplarist virtue ethics describe a moral psychology in which emotions play a key 
role. We are indebted to exemplars for our moral education. These exemplars evoke our 
admiration when they embody the virtues, and it is through this emotional response 
that we begin to identify what is good about exemplars and understand the virtues 
(Zagzebski 2017). This emotion of admiration is central to our ability to make moral 
judgments. Furthermore, like other virtue theories, Zagzebski expects the habituation 
that is part and parcel of virtue acquisition to shape the emotions of the virtuous. Since 
moral judgment involves beholding an intentional object through the valence of 
emotion, those who are truly virtuous will stand in the correct emotional relationship to 
that which is good and that which is bad. They will feel pity when someone deserves 
pity; they will feel anger when states of affairs call for anger. When we emulate 
exemplars and attempt to acquire the virtues they exemplify, we do more than copy 
those we admire; we try to assimilate both the actions and motivating emotions into our 
life (2017, 219-220). 
Given the role of such internal states for moral formation, accounts that give us 
insight into the inner life of moral exemplars are mentioned as an important source of 
moral understanding (2017, 104-111). Among these accounts are biographies, fictional 
narratives, and studies that rely on data from interviews and diaries. In the Christian 
predecessor to Zagzebski’s exemplarism, Divine Motivation Theory, Zagzebski suggests 
looking to Jesus Christ as the ultimate moral exemplar (2004, 228-256). The doctrine of 
the Incarnation provides an unusually fitting candidate for this kind of exemplarism 
because the moral perfection of the divine is manifested in human psychological states. 
Biographical content about the life of Christ contributes to our moral education because 
it permits us to imitate him. His emotions and actions serve as a model for how we 
should respond to objects of moral evaluation in our lives. 
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In one explanation of divine motivation theory, Zagzebski makes the interesting 
claim that God’s motivational states are the ontological and explanatory basis for moral 
properties (1998, 539). According to this view, our motives should resemble God’s 
motives. This does not mean that the set of virtues for humans and God will be identical 
(1998, 548). Some of our virtues are related to our creaturely nature and therefore 
inadmissible as virtues of God. Nevertheless, God serves as the basis for all that is good 
in us; Lev. 19:20 says something to this effect when it exhorts us to be holy as God 
himself is holy.  
To see how this theory might apply to the genre of prophetic writings, consider 
Nevi’im in light of Zagzebski’s account of moral formation. Passages in which the 
prophets relay a Godview of human matters, particular those of moral significance, give 
the reader an idea of God’s perfect emotions and motivations. Take, for example, a 
passage from Jeremiah: 
 
“Thus says the Lord: 
 
What wrong did your ancestors find in me 
    that they went far from me, 
and went after worthless things, and became worthless themselves? 
They did not say, “Where is the Lord 
    who brought us up from the land of Egypt, 
who led us in the wilderness, 
    in a land of deserts and pits, 
in a land of drought and deep darkness, 
    in a land that no one passes through, 
    where no one lives?”  
I brought you into a plentiful land 
    to eat its fruits and its good things. 
But when you entered you defiled my land, 
    and made my heritage an abomination.  
The priests did not say, “Where is the Lord?” 
    Those who handle the law did not know me; 
the rulers transgressed against me; 
    the prophets prophesied by Baal, 
    and went after things that do not profit.  
Therefore once more I accuse you, 
says the Lord, 
    and I accuse your children’s children.  
Cross to the coasts of Cyprus and look, 
    send to Kedar and examine with care; 
    see if there has ever been such a thing.  
Has a nation changed its gods, 
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    even though they are no gods? 
But my people have changed their glory 
    for something that does not profit.  
Be appalled, O heavens, at this, 
    be shocked, be utterly desolate, 
says the Lord,  
for my people have committed two evils: 
    they have forsaken me, 
the fountain of living water, 
    and dug out cisterns for themselves, 
cracked cisterns 
    that can hold no water.  
(Jer. 2:5-13) 
 
In this passage, note that God takes issue not only with the actions of his people, but the 
way in which his people seem to view him. The reasons for God’s “charges” against his 
people are given in explicit terms. They neglected to ask, “Where is the Lord?” Even 
those who should have been experts when it came to knowledge of God did not know 
him. By posing the rhetorical question, “What wrong did your ancestors find in me?”, 
God makes it clear that he has been faultless in his dealings with his people, and yet 
they have failed in their part of the relationship. God has been good, a “fountain of 
living waters” in the desert, and yet his people prefer corrupt nations and idols to him.   
That God gives an account of the reasons for his judgment is incredibly important. 
Like the parent whose child heeds the guidance of a friend over parental instruction, 
knowing why God acts is morally informative. A parent who is merely concerned with 
the obedience of her child will not attempt to amend her relationship with a teenager 
who is beginning to trust friends over her parents. If she can coerce her child into correct 
behavior through punishment, her goal will be achieved. However, a parent who uses 
such an incident to not only modify the behavior of her child, but help her child relate 
properly to those she should trust (i.e., those who have her best interest at heart and the 
wisdom to guide her) is interested in more than the actions of her child; she is interested 
in whether her child has certain affective states. Further, the parent’s interest in her 
child’s inner life manifests aspects of her own affective states; namely, it shows what she 
values and finds to be morally significant. The prophetic writings make it abundantly 
clear that God is not merely interested in getting his people to “behave”; he is interested 
in being known by his people and relied upon by them. God contends such a 
relationship will be like a spring of living water to his people; he wants them to continue 
to draw from this relationship rather than turning to other relationships that will 
ultimately destroy them. When God acts in judgment, this passage tells us that at least 
one reason he does so is because of a damaged relationship. 
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Consider nearby verses in which God describes his people as a bride who is no longer 
devoted (Jer. 2:2), or as a donkey in heat (2:23-25), or as a disgraced thief (2:26). Such 
language gives us insight into how disobedience and idolatry are perceived by God. As 
an object of moral evaluation, God sees his people like we would see such a bride, 
donkey, or thief. These examples elicit a sense of betrayal and disappointment, revulsion 
at unbridled lust, and frustration and indignation. This is in addition to passages like 
Jer. 7:20 and 14:17, in which God expressly attributes emotions like anger and grief to 
himself. 
In these passages God models perfect dispositions towards the subjects of his 
contemplation. The prophets show us the perfect being’s side of his relationship with us, 
making it clear that he is not unaffected by our moral states. They allow us to know God 
as more than just the law giver; we gain perspective on the intensely personal way God 
is connected to his people. This psychological language serves another closely related 
function. It models for us how we should respond to our own moral transgressions and 
the transgressions of others. When we or others cheat the poor, the proper response is 
intense anger (Jer. 2:34-35). When we fail to seek God, we should feel as though we have 
neglected or betrayed someone as close to us as a spouse (2:1-3). While some of these 
responses will be modified due to the unique relational demands God can make of us 
versus those we can ethically make of each other, many of God’s self-descriptions can 
readily be understood as exemplifying the way a perfect agent evaluates human action 
on a cognitive and emotional level. 
In many ways, this position is in harmony with recent works on biblical epistemology 
and narrative. Eleonore Stump emphasizes the usefulness of biblical narrative (and 
narrative in general) in addressing ethical questions (such as the existence of suffering) 
not easily answered by other realms of thought (2010, 26). She argues that narratives 
dealing with personal relationships have the capacity to confer what she calls Franciscan 
(elsewhere dubbed “second-personal”) knowledge. This knowledge of persons is not 
reducible to propositions, and it “enables a person to know the actions, intentions, and 
emotions of another person in a direct, intuitive way analogous in some respects to 
perception” (2010, 41-42, 47-48, 81). Read in this light, by second-personal knowledge 
we share in the explanation God gives to Job, and we know something of what 
Abraham knew when God gave back his heart’s desire, none of which can be stated in 
propositional form (2010, 222-27, 307-08). 
One way of understanding my reading of Nevi’im is as augmenting the claims of 
both Zagzebski and Stump. In response to Zagzebski, I suggest that Christians should 
learn from what I loosely call the moral psychology of God as revealed by the prophets. 
This moral psychology has important differences from the one provided by the 
Incarnation: The example of Jesus provides all the virtues realized in human form, and it 
is therefore more easily observed and emulated. Jesus’s life also provides important 
context for how the virtues are enacted through duties and habits. He “emptied himself, 
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taking the form of a servant” as it says in Phil. 2, and he modeled obedience to his 
Father and the devotion of a faithful Jew.  
In contrast, many of the emotions of God in the prophets would be inappropriate for 
human emulation, as it would often be prideful to treat a fellow sinner with wrathful 
anger because of our status of moral equals. The nature of our allegiance to God far 
outweighs any allegiance another might owe us, making God’s expressed feelings of 
indignation and betrayal incommensurate with those we might be tempted to feel. This 
does not mean that we can learn nothing from orations about God’s emotions and 
motivations. We see that God is willing to go to great lengths so that his people will 
know him, even allowing terrible suffering, demonstrating the importance of knowing 
who God is and treating him accordingly. We also see those human actions that move 
God to act in anger, and learn in many cases what should disgust and inflame our moral 
sensibilities, such as pagan worship, corrupt leaders, and the abandonment of children 
and widows. We learn more than what we should do; we learn how we should behold 
certain actions and qualities, and the motivating emotions that should ultimately 
compel us to act. 
These passages have something important in common with the narratives mentioned 
by Stump. Their depiction of God’s “moral psychology” is a source of instructive 
second-personal knowledge that gives us insight into who God is. The judgments and 
complaints issued by God in narratives are made more comprehensible by the emotive 
orations in the prophets. Even the figurative language, such as that depicting God as an 
abandoned husband or nursing mother, has an undeniably emotionally-charged tone 
that makes more sense if we think that emotions are an important part of moral 
judgment and second-personal knowledge is morally instructive: There is something 
genuinely relevant about the emotions of earthly mothers and husbands that is relevant 
to God’s cognitive and affective disposition towards his people. 
 
8. Biblical Epistemology, Opacity, and the New Testament 
 
One consequence of my view is that not all readers will be able to grasp the entirety of 
important prophetic messages. This is because one’s understanding of the moral 
psychology of God will vary with one’s own moral development. Humans vary in their 
acquisition of virtues and their relevant motivating emotions. Some will need to practice 
and observe traits like compassion in others for some time before they have acquired it 
for themselves. They may be able to comprehend a propositional formulation of 
compassion, but until they have reflected on it in the lives of others, they will lack 
important understanding of what compassion is. They may gain yet greater knowledge 
when they become virtuous themselves. 
This consequence is in harmony with a biblical understanding how humans acquire 
knowledge. According to Dru Johnson, the Hebrew Scriptures take participation and 
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practice to play a central role in human understanding. He forwards a theory of biblical 
epistemology in which deference to authorities and enactment are key components of 
what it is to know (2013; 2016).29 Johnson makes an analogy between the acquisition of 
language and biblical knowledge acquisition: Ritualized practice, like that conducted 
when learning a language, opens the gateway to the recognition of truth and eventually 
what he calls “discernment,” a mastery or skillfulness in a domain of knowledge (2016, 
78-89). 
Consider how moral education might be understood along this understanding of 
biblical epistemology. On Johnson’s theory, practice of virtue would precede one’s 
ability to recognize and understand many aspects of virtue. It follows that those with 
undeveloped moral sensibilities--who have not “tried” to be loving, compassionate, etc.-
-will not understand some salient aspects of God’s moral judgments. His statements will 
be opaque or unclear because such individuals lack the Franciscan knowledge and 
moral understanding necessary to fully comprehend the terms He is using. If I am right, 
it is not that God and the prophetic authors are intentionally making moral claims 
obscure; it is that they are intentionally making claims they know will be inscrutable to 
some, and only partially available to others. 
In this way, the prophetic writings are “opaque” to some audiences. This explains 
why God might proclaim on the outset of a message that his words will not be 
understood or even heard by his people. If the point is merely to communicate 
instructions about the kind of life that leads to the good, it seems strange or even passive 
aggressive of God to dismiss his audience so immediately. However, if his point is to 
exemplify the perfect moral life of God in the way I have described it, these passages are 
not nearly as puzzling. When Jeremiah proclaims that the people cannot see or hear, it is 
unsurprising that he appears to draw a connection to stubborn and rebellious hearts 
(5:21-25). No one listens and ears are closed because they do not stand in the proper 
affective and cognitive state in relation to the word of the Lord; that is, they find it 
offensive and find no pleasure in it when instead they should love and relish it (6:10). 
Devotion to idols has so distorted the moral psychology of some that Isaiah compares 
them to the idols because they cannot see or understand (44:18ff). Such people are “ever 
hearing, but never understanding...ever seeing, but never perceiving” (Is. 6:9) because 
understanding increases with the acquisition of virtue and good (rather than vicious) 
habituated emotions.30 That means that, by their own blindness, the morally corrupt 
                                                   
29 Admittedly, Johnson focuses on connection between knowledge and the enactment of rituals, but it 
is impossible to ignore the parallels with Zagzebski and Stump, especially since the rituals in the Hebrew 
Scriptures have wisdom and moral qualities like thankfulness as their aims. 
30 This passage is interpreted by Hazony as “psychological thesis” about humans’ lack of 
understanding obscuring reality (2012, 87). His interpretation bears certain similarities to my own, but he 
fails to apply it to his reading of the New Testament. 
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cannot understand much of what God says, and the virtuous will understand more. This 
obscurity is built into the nature of ethics and the moral education of persons. 
Interestingly, it is this passage –Isaiah 6:9– that Jesus quotes in Mark 4, and this 
passage has caused many to interpret Jesus’s teaching as mystical or obscure. Hazony 
apparently shares this view, or at least takes it to be the consensus among interpreters of 
the New Testament (2012, 84-5). If we take Jesus at his word, though, he intended to do 
something continuous with the Hebrew prophets. I see no reason why Jesus’s many 
comments about his audience’s inability to comprehend him should not be taken in the 
same vein as the saying of prophets like Isaiah. Like the prophets of the Hebrew 
Scriptures, Jesus employed language to make his moral teachings accessible. His moral 
instruction is filled with parables drawing upon the everyday life of his audience. He 
also built upon passages of the Hebrew Scriptures that would be familiar to the Jewish 
people. Why, if it is clear that Jesus meant to obscure his teachings, did Jesus make use 
of these rhetorical devices? Perhaps, like the prophets of Nevi’im, Jesus knew his words 
would both disclose moral truths to those prepared to hear them, while remaining 
challenging or even imperceptible to the hard of heart. 
If my understanding of Nevi’im is correct, I have shown that the prophetic writings 
serve the unique purpose of providing a moral psychology of God. This means that the 
prophetic writings contain important moral content that should inform Jewish and 
Christian ethics. Further work would involve interpreting exactly what morally relevant 
psychological states are depicted in Nevi’im and which of these states might be 
applicable to a human audience. Of particular interest are those passages describing 
divine wrath that often frighten Christians, who sometimes find it difficult to reconcile 
wrathful descriptions of God with the example set by Jesus in the New Testament. I 
have some ideas about how this reconciliation might be accomplished, but that is a task 
for another project. 
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